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Abstract
This article analyses the capacity of statutory and
non-statutory tools to rescue a distressed company and
is focused on Greece where state policies including
excessive taxation, interventionism and excessive
borrowing drove many companies to failure. It proposes
that a corporate rescue culture be cultivated in Greece
to tackle the excessive failure rates and the development
of intensive care units in the banks which can indicate
corporate failure early on.
Introduction
It could well be a matter of historical research. After
almost 10 years of recession and eight years of strict
financial control by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the European institutions, it would be rational
to hypothesise that the Greek economy has gained
momentum and the macro-economic andmicroeconomic
indicators would have started to present signs of recovery.
However, the problems are not an issue of the past, at
least for Greece. While the particularities of the ongoing
macro-economic complexities are not the subject of this
article, the failure of the critical mass of Greek enterprises
to find ways to revitalise their operations and to avoid
collapse, is something that causes increasing concern. It
is too simple to just blame macro-economic issues. A
rethink is necessary regarding the way we deal with
troubled businesses in Greece.
Considering this, we present the alternative of
“informal re-organisation” as opposed to formal, i.e.
judicial re-organisation procedures. We believe that
finding ways to deviate from inflexible and mostly
ineffective formal procedures can be of great interest to
lawyers, entrepreneurs, managers, bankers and civil
services as it will help more businesses to survive and
(again) thrive.
An “informal re-organisation” can be defined as
follows:
“a reorganization route which takes place outside
the statutory framework with the objective of
restoring the health of a company in financial
difficulties within the same legal entity”.
Within an informal re-organisation, it will often be
necessary to reach agreement with the company’s lenders
(usually banks) and sometimes other stakeholders (e.g.
trade creditors, employee representatives/unions, tax
authorities) about changing agreements made earlier
and/or new agreements on financing or employee lay-offs.
When such an agreement is effected on a voluntary basis,
we have a “workout agreement” while the process to
come to this point is often called “informal workout”.
With a view to the following study, the definition of an
“informal workout agreement” is described as follows:
“an agreement concluded between the interested
parties of a business in distress within an informal
reorganization with regard to the review of
conditions pertaining to funds made available and
the way forward regarding the necessary turnaround
measures, without resorting to legal procedures to
effectuate this”.1
We structure this article as follows: first, we describe
some relevant historical factors of corporate failure in
Greece, well before the macro-economic crisis erupted.
Then we describe internal causes of corporate distress
and ensuing bottlenecks of business rescue efforts in
Greece. Following that, we pay attention to the role of
the banks in Greece in distressed-lending situations. After
that, we introduce some dogmatic foundations of business
rescue procedures and we introduce the concept of
informal workout/re-organisation principles, based on
the so-called “LondonApproach”. Next, wewill advocate
the promotion and adoption of a new “rescue culture” in
Greece based on the London Approach principles. We
call it the “Athens Approach”. We will further discuss
the advantages and possible obstacles of such new way
of dealing with financial distress.
Defining “financial distress”
A “company in financial distress” (distressed company)
can be defined as follows: “… [it is] a company where
the current and/or future cash flow is insufficient to fulfill
the current and/or future obligations”.2Hence, a company
is in distress when one can speak of imminent financial
difficulties or we have a situation where, according to the
assessments of those involved, financial difficulties will
occur in the short or long term if no intervention
(re-organisation) takes place. According to the law in
Greece, a company is eligible for applying for rescue
procedures when it faces present or probable impossibility
of fulfilling its due financial obligations in a general
* Ioannis Sidiropoulos is affiliated to the law firm Elias Neocleous & Co LLC in Cyprus and the Leiden Law School, part of Leiden University, in the Netherlands. Jan
Adriaanse is professor of turnaround management at the Leiden Law School and partner at corporate finance firm BFI Global in Amsterdam.
1 See J.A.A. Adriaanse, “Restructuring in the Shadow of the Law: Informal Reorganisation in the Netherlands” (Leiden: Kluwer, 2005).
2 See Adriaanse, “Restructuring in the Shadow of the Law” (2005), p.12.
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manner.3 As said, we propose a paradigm shift for
companies in financial difficulties from using law-based
rescue procedures towards informal rescue procedures
“in the shadow of insolvency law”.
The environment of business rescue—
macro issues
The 1980s and 1990s have been particularly tough for
Greek entrepreneurship and turnaround efforts. This is
due to a fundamental change in Greek politics as the then
new Government (after the elections of 1981) decided to
encourage a greater engagement of labour unions in the
economy. Notwithstanding the political rationale—which
can well lie in the “eye of the beholder”—the undisputed
result is that there has been an upsurge of strikes
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. It can easily be
understood that this caused significant disruptions to the
smooth function of many businesses, dropping their
productivity to non-viable levels. Additionally, necessary
restructuring processes were often perceived in a strange
way as employees of distressed companies demanded to
actively participate and have an effective say. These
practices were rarely successful as employees often had
only a restricted view and tended to over-stress the
importance of their claims.
Indeed, in many cases, labour unions and employees
demonstrated a certain dislike of change which took the
form of an unwillingness to participate in common
meetings, requests for excessive provisions of information
and dragging the whole process to delays in order to
satisfy demands that could have easily been settled had
there been (more) goodwill and trust. Moreover, in a
framework of increased state intervention policy, many
foreign investors experienced pressure to admit state
representatives on to the boards of their domestic
businesses. Also, the state perceived healthy businesses
as a source of tax revenue and corporate taxation
indicators have been generally increased throughout the
1980s, 1990s and 2000s while, at the same time, there
was no genuine and organised state policy boosting
economic and entrepreneurial growth.
Papadakis and Papoulias4 provide a classification of
macro-reasons of distress and “sabotage” of restructuring
efforts. First, they mention the political environment (i.e.
governmental stability, environmental legislation). Since
the crisis erupted in 2009, Greece has seen six different
governments. Secondly, the financial environment,
especially regarding (the lack of) investment financing.
Thirdly, the social environment. Fourthly, the
technological environment (i.e. lack of research and
development (R&D), patents, capacity of innovation). A
chronic deficiency in Greece is the underfunding of
research in its universities and its other research
institutions. The crisis made things muchworse in general
and in particular for corporate R&D departments.5 Lastly,
the demographic environment.
Unfortunately, as has been repeatedly observed, the
above-mentioned public pathogens tend to be extended
to the choice of tools and methods with which the Greek
state handles public and private debt that do not
adequately address the substantial problems: superficial
manipulations, piecemeal measures with proven
short-term character and a general reluctance to
institutionalise and adopt substantial sections.6
Regrettably, the majority of Greek governments during
the last 40 years did not really support corporate
restructuring and workouts in an organised and long-term
manner. The primitive effort of the 1980s with the
Organization for Business Restructuring (OAE) proved
unsuccessful. Evenwhen relevantmeasures were decided,
they were delayed.7
To summarise, the external environment for Greek
businesses to re-organise or to be rescued has historically
been bad. This calls for a new view on business rescue.
Main internal causes of corporate
distress and ensuing bottlenecks of
turnaround efforts in Greece
Undertaking bibliographic research to address the
domestic reasons of corporate distress relates to the
notions of “bad” and insufficient management.8 In Greece,
this usually has the meaning of management without
depth and diversity and this is, mostly, the case when
only one person is in charge. Thus, the critical decisions
concerning business choices, when made by only one
executive, have certain deficiencies like a one-sided view
and being prone to get out of control. The sole manager
is, for instance, not able to cross-check his decisions in
a solid and objective framework, something that would
be the case if he or she could take advantage of a diverse,
capable, experienced and well-educated composition of
a board of directors.9 This part is particularly important
for our aim to dig out one of the most critical and decisive
3Article 99(1) of the Greek Insolvency Code (GIC).
4 See A. Georgopoulos, “Restructuring and Management of Change in Business” (kallipos.gr: Greek academic e-books), p.19. See also B. Papadakis, Business Strategy,
6th edn (Athens: Bennou Publishing, 2012) and D.B. Papoulias, Strategic Business Administration and Changes (Athens: Kastaniotis Publications, 2002) (all in Greek).
5Eurostat 2015a, calculations by DIW Econ.
6Union of Greek Industrialists, “Business Environment Observatory: The insolvency framework in Greece; A second chance or slow death?” (Athens, November 2017),
p.7 (in Greek).
7Olga Tsolka, Problematic Companies; Should they be Closed or Continue their Activities? (Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers, 1987), pp.32, 43.
8 J. Argenti, Corporate Collapse: The Causes and Symptoms (London: McGraw-Hill, 1976).
9A. Giotas, “Corporate Insolvency, Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Research” (Thessaloniki: Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Macedonia, 2015),
p.20 (in Greek).
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reasons for corporate failure in Greece: the one of
“self-governance” (to avoid misunderstanding: this is not
unique for Greece, it also applies in other jurisdictions).10
A quite relevant issue in this context is also the problem
of inadequate attention paid by the Government,
universities and other educational institutions to the
creation of an education system for managers with
particular attention to “turnaround management skills”
and, most importantly, the apparent lack of interest of
many companies to employ capable and competent
management professionals (this too is a universal problem
that becomesmore acute in times of distress). Navrozidou
puts it this way (translated): “what can be seen in many
Greek businesses is that corporate directors often seem
to indulge in a kind of corporate nepotism”.11 This is the
case even in the aftermath of the macro-economic crisis
that has created so many pitfalls for businesses in Greece.
Many companies confine their recruiting processes to a
small group of executives and supervisors, serving only
the interests of the major shareholders
which—ironically—often leads to a detrimental situation
for the latter.
Executives who are not actually anxious for the
corporate buoyancy but are more interested in the
functionality of the “golden parachute” of their boss can
play a destructive role from the misinterpretation of the
early warning signs to the handling of creditors’ claims.
A closely related aspect is that in many Greek companies
a lack of honest and effective co-operation exists between
the lower and upper echelons of corporate staff. In such
cases, management is unable to take heed of the warning
messages of the workforce relating to business failure
risks experienced on the shop floor.12
In addition, it is unfortunately widely observed in
Greece that, due to fear of stigma and due to harbouring
hopes of recovery, company leaders are rarely willing to
initiate judicial let alone informal business rescue
proceedings. These kinds of initiatives are often left to
creditors with the risk of company management losing
control; these companies are often referred to as “zombie”
companies as immediate and radical turnaround
management is necessary yet not enough effort is initiated
from the inside.13
Another quite important aspect that unfortunately drove
many Greek companies recently to distress is the
under-representation of the finance function on the board.
This means that, in many cases, there is an issue of lack
of required control on basic key-performing indicators.
Insufficient information on accounting issues is one
category of such failure.Moreover, according to Sarvani,14
companies often tend to focus on annual financial
statements while not paying enough attention to daily
financial performance and actual market developments
(not surprisingly, this is also a universal problem).
As a result of the above-mentioned lack of
(self)awareness, disproportionate business expansion is
also a key factor of corporate distress in the Greek
market.15 Having an aim to prevail over a big part of the
market, expanding companies increase their sales in an
excessive way, while at the same time restraining profit
margins or promoting their debit sales, in the interest of
their expansion, makes them extremely vulnerable to
distress.16
There is also the problem of excessive debt exposure
in Greece.17 This is often the result of a lack of
(intentionally or not) dependable studies/estimations of
investment purposefulness as well as of any possible
excess of investment budget. It has not been unusual for
lots of Greek companies during the last 20 years to
encounter default problems only two–five years after an
initial lending agreement and subsequent investment.18
Things were particularly bad in cases where the most
important investment steps took place amidst the latter
severe economic crisis with companies’ management
underestimating the costs and overestimating the revenue
and profits entailed.19
It has also been found20 that a common problem for
Greek small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in
decline is the inability to compete on price due to high
fixed and variable production costs and small profit
margins.21 This creates a vicious circle putting an
additional strain on rescue efforts. Moreover, high labour
costs, misuse of corporate benefits and the relocation of
production units to access cheaper workers in other
countries, led to even lower margins.22
10See, e.g. T. Clarke, “Cycles of Crisis and Regulation: The Enduring Agency and Stewardship Problems of Corporate Governance—Corporate Governance: An International
Review” (2004) Wiley Online Library [online]; G.D. Carnegie, T. Brendan and A. O’Connell, “A Longitudinal Study of the Interplay of Corporate Collapse, Accounting
Failure and Governance Change in Australia: Early 1890s to early 2000s” (2014) 25(6) Critical Perspectives on Accounting 446; J. Lee and G. Shailer, “The Effect of
Board-Related Reforms on Investors’ Confidence” (2018) 18(2) Australian Accounting Review 123–134; D.A. Zetzsche, “Explicit and Implicit System of Corporate
Control—A Convergence Theory of Shareholder Rights” (2004) SSRN Electronic Journal [online].
11 P. Navrozidou, Reasons for the Phenomenon of Problematic Companies and Prospects of Rehabilitation (Kavala: School of Management and Economy, 1997), p.10 (in
Greek).
12 See Giotas, “Corporate Insolvency, Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Research” (2015).
13Union of Greek Industrialists, “Business Environment Observatory: The insolvency framework in Greece” (2017), p.48.
14 I. Sarvani, “Corporate restructuring” (Thessaloniki: Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Macedonia, 2016), p.17 (in Greek).
15K. Charalambidis, “Recovery strategies in order to address corporate distress: A critical theoretical review and experimental investigation in the framework of Athens
Stock Exchange” (Thessaloniki: Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Macedonia, November 2011), p.372 (in Greek).
16 See Navrozidou, Reasons for the Phenomenon of Problematic Companies and Prospects of Rehabilitation (1997), p.14.
17 See Giotas, “Corporate Insolvency, Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Research” (2015), p.22.
18 See Navrozidou, Reasons for the Phenomenon of Problematic Companies and Prospects of Rehabilitation (1997), p.8.
19G. Katsos, Distressed Companies Greece. Causes, Prevention and Rehabilitation (Athens: Eptalofos Publications, 1988), p.61 (in Greek).
20 See Sarvani, “Corporate restructuring” (2016), p.18.
21N. Tzakou-Lambropoulou, “The spotting of indebtedness” in the “Treatment of Indebtedness” (23rd Conference of the Union of Greek Commercial Law Professionals,
2013), p.51 (in Greek).
22 See Sarvani, “Corporate restructuring” (2016).
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Apart from the above-mentioned results of
bibliographical research, recent interviews with some
notable Greek lawyers, economists and public servants
having relevant experience provided us with additional
interesting insights in the bottlenecks of business rescue
in Greece. For example, the role of shareholders was
considered to be unhelpful. Greek shareholders often
seem to be reticent concerning the contribution of
risk-bearing capital to help their company survive
particularly during a crisis.
Moreover, it was reported that turnaround efforts in
Greece have frequently been affected by the departure of
valued executives hired by companies as external
turnaround managers, as they felt that they did not have
the motivation to remain in a failing business
environment—the problems of which just seem to be
unsolvable. In addition to the mentioned bottlenecks of
Greek rescue efforts are the large damages claims that
distressed companies may face due to their inability to
fulfil contractual obligations. The legal disputes (apart
from insolvency ones) are unfortunately quite lengthy.
The average duration of a judicial process in Greece is
about 920 days.23 In 2016, the number of pending cases
only in the Greek Civil Courts was 648,947 (Eirinodikeia,
Protodikeia, Efeteia).24 This means that rescue efforts are
often delayed due to the unknown outcome of disputes.
Goal
Our main goal in this article is to encourage company
leaders who need to focus more on early warning signs
and act accordingly, i.e. they need to be more preoccupied
with business failure and be able to use turnaround
management techniques as soon as the first signs of
looming distress appear. This also includes having a
greater capacity to utilise informal business rescue
(pre-insolvency) measures in order to address illiquidity.
Secondly, we encourage state representatives and
legislators to pay greater attention to signs of the market
regarding the need for sound business rescuemechanisms
and to adapt their regulatory initiatives to this reality.
Thirdly, we encourage educational institutions in Greece
to pay more attention to turnaround management and
business rescue training.
The role of Greek banks
Another reason that undermined the viability of Greek
companies—also impairing any turnaround efforts—well
before the crisis erupted, has been the control that the
state exerted on the banking sector.25Many of the banking
institutions have been state controlled for many years
(until the end of the 1990s and some of them well into
the 2000s). With the banks working under such political
supervision/pressure, it has proved to be quite difficult
for them to assume the role of “dynamic and independent
business consultant”, i.e. to push companies to turnaround
if deemed necessary based on contractual rights to
terminate credit facilities in case of doubt regarding the
viability of the debtor-company. The banking sector also
contributed to the cause and worsening of the problems
by providing companies with loans without enough prior
probing of the long-term profit prospects and, thus, the
capacity of those businesses to refund their debts.26 The
banking institutions preferred to grant short-term loans
in order to cover the losses of use and also the financial
needs of investment programmes of the past.27
In many cases, corporate directors were able to secure
funding in order to start businesses or save their already
existing distressed companies, without any dependable
and elaborate analysis on behalf of the banks, in terms of
cost analysis and prospects of success/survival. The
non-documented but well-known reason for these
phenomena were, in many cases, apart from
unemployment policies, politically motivated. These
practices, however, turned out to be a dead-end street
with many such companies ending up bankrupt. The
numerous empty and mostly ruined and vandalised
industrial buildings in various places in Greece (already
the case before the crisis erupted) are a living proof.
Lack of banking engagement and
confidence
Trying to evaluate the general reflexes of banks towards
the incoming crisis, as was demonstrated especially in
the years leading up to the crisis, made us realise that
banking institutions were not eager to become involved
in the decision-making process of the company at the
initial stage of difficulties (that could surely make the
difference, as stated before, in exerting some kind of
pressure on the otherwise uncontrolled management).
However, the main reasons that allowed this situation had
been, first, the lack of time available to devote to
distressed SMEs and, also, in many cases, lack of
knowledge, expertise, capability and support on behalf
of the legal regime. Unfortunately, despite the immense
problem of distressed loans in Greece, the quality of
specialised “intensive care” units and the level of foreign
banks’ services in case of non-performing loans is yet to
be reached by the equivalent Greek units.28
To make things worse, the global crisis had a serious
negative impact on the confidence of bank managers to
provide lending facilities or to continue the existing ones,
23Union of Greek Industrialists, “Business Environment Observatory: The insolvency framework in Greece” (November 2017), p.10. See ADR Center in co-operation with
European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (UEAPME) and European Company Lawyers Association (ECLA), Survey Data Report: The Cost of
Non-ADR: Surveying and Showing the Actual Costs of Intra- Community Commercial Litigation (2010) available at: http://www.adrcenterinternational.com/wp-content
/uploads/2016/04/Survey-Data-Report.pdf [Accessed 11 June 2019].
24 Special report of the Union of Greek Industrialists, Greek Justice (14 June 2017).
25M. Petousis, “The Greek Banking system and the much-advertised banking mentality” Financial Post, 18 July 1985, pp.23–25 (in Greek).
26 See Navrozidou, Reasons for the Phenomenon of Problematic Companies and Prospects of Rehabilitation (1997), p.16.
27 See Navrozidou, Reasons for the Phenomenon of Problematic Companies and Prospects of Rehabilitation (1997), p.16.
28Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Economic Surveys, “Greece Overview” (March 2016), p.31.
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in the way that they did before the crisis. The global
financial crisis went through the real economy of all
countries with adverse effects on the whole economy.29
Due to macro-economic reasons that are not the subject
of this article, the global financial crisis triggered the
severe debt crisis of Greece. Banking throughout the
world and, therefore, in Greece presented a so-called
“credit crunch”, that is, the sudden aversion towards risk
and subsequent reduction of lending supply.30 The
reluctance of banks to lend, coupled with the
destruction-reduction of wealth of households and
businesses, led to a huge reduction in consumption and,
therefore, trade.31
Despite the recent position expressed by the Supreme
Court of Greece concerning, first, the crucial role of banks
as organisations which (should) support growth and
businesses and the relevant responsibility that they bear
on the interests of the companies they fund,32 things are
still disappointingly different. Nowadays, banks tend to
provide credit coverage with prerequisites that clearly
resemble the ones of housing loans (guarantees on
land/immovable assets) and they most of the time do not
actually analyse the business viability of companies.33
Bank managers are nervous and extremely alert in light
of the slightest signs of corporate weakness and the result
is, in many cases, the premature “pulling of the plug”
(cancellation of credit). This environment of lack of
confidence and lack of flexibility is clearly a heavy burden
on turnaround and business rescue efforts.
An aim of our work is to underline the critical nature
of this problem, ringing the alarm of the diminished cash
availability in the Greek market. The Greek banks have
received large injections of liquidity during the years of
the crisis, not only in order to secure their solvency but
also in order to facilitate greater financial safety for the
corporate environment in Greece. This should be used to
finance companies and with that economic growth,
nevertheless, banks should also strive for sound balance
sheets themselves in order to survive and thrive
independently. This is a paradox that can be solved by
means of more attention towards early signs of financial
distress in lending relationships and using turnaround and
informal business rescue mechanisms to solve issues at
an early stage.
Dogmatic foundations of informal
business rescue procedures
It is not difficult to understand that a company that is able
to maintain a rudimentary functionality amidst financial
problems (going concern) has a greater value than a
company which is subject to a forced sale. In addition,
commencement of formal (public) insolvency procedures
in relation to a company has, in most cases, adverse
effects on the value of its business.34 Therefore,
stakeholders in international practice often spend time
and money in order to devise (ad hoc) mechanisms that
can address the aforementioned problem, which usually
takes the form of private/informal business rescue
procedures, often called (informal) “workouts”. This is
also the case in Greece, where such efforts remain “in the
shadow of the law”, not being advertised.
It is impossible to disregard the doctrinal and practical
value that the concept of informal business rescue has for
Greece. Greece has a purely continental law context.
Therefore, its legal professionals, and particularly those
who deal with law-making, often seem particularly
reluctant to accept that the law itself can and should be
deviated. Our point is that we do not see the deviation of
the law as our goal. What needs to be proven is that
informal workouts can exist in harmony with the
insolvency formalities, thus they take place “in the
shadow of the law”. This is probably more challenging
and demanding as a legal exercise in Greece than
elsewhere such as the US, the UK, Cyprus and other
common law jurisdictions. At the same time, these legal
systems provide us with effective theoretical insights in
order to help us understand how formal and informal
procedures can coexist in an effective way.
According to, among others, Segal35 the usual worries
of the engaged credit providers are the following: the
unsecured banks may probably want to share in the
security (this being connected to the issue of sharing
recoveries), while the secured ones will look to ensure
payback, which can be considered at least more
advantageous when compared to an immediate failure of
the borrower. Also, creditors cannot be forced to
co-operate and with that they can even frustrate workout
attempts (this is called the “hold-out problem”). Thus, it
is understood that unanimous support of the creditor banks
is an issue of utmost importance in the case of successful
turnaround efforts but at the same time is also a challenge.
At that point, the UK paradigm offers some good
advice, in our effort to decipher the actual value of
informal turnaround efforts in Greece. Much of the
success of informal workouts in the UK can be traced
back to a phenomenon that started in the 1970s and was
then called the “London Approach”. It can be described
as follows:
29N. Birdsall, “How to unlock the $1 trillion that developing countries urgently need to cope with the crisis” (Center for Global Development, 2009), pp.1–5.
30N. Chatzilefteris-Michalas, “Comparative Financial Analysis of Systemic Banks in Greece” (Thessaloniki: University of Macedonia, January 2017), p.5. See also G.
Chardouvelis and N. Karamouzis, From the International Crisis to the Eurozone Crisis: What Does the Future Hold? (Athens: Livanis Publications, 2011) (all in Greek).
31 See Chatzilefteris-Michalas, “Comparative Financial Analysis of Systemic Banks in Greece” (2017), p.5; Chardouvelis and Karamouzis, From the International Crisis
to the Eurozone Crisis (2011).
32 Supreme Court of Greece, Decision 1352/2011.
33 S. Komninos, “NPLs and meaningless policies for the businesses” (liberal.gr, 5 August 2017) (in Greek).
34N. Segal, Banks and Remedies (London: Lloyd’s of London Press, 1992), p.132.
35 See Segal, Banks and Remedies (1992), p.133.
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“[The London Approach] is a cooperative basis by
which lender creditors recognise individual and
collective risk at a point in time and keep that
balance throughout an agreed debt recovery strategy
that seeks to preserve business.”36
Such an approach can be seen to be closely related to
the management of professional authority and not to the
inflexible use of regulations, as the statutory rules
themselves are too weak to bring a successful conclusion
to the efforts.37 According to Goffman and Harre, moral
suasion and moral labour are important for the success
of this kind of effort.38 Flood also mentions that, at least
in the UK, the notion of “practitioner’s buzz” is to be
given attention.39 The author defines it as “the successful
management of risk, of unpredictability of people, of
transience of assets and money, and the creation and
establishment of trust”.40
An important basis of the relevant argumentation is
indicated by Armour and Deakin.41 According to them,
it can be demonstrated that social norms can provide a
basis for co-ordination among different parties, without
having to resort to the formal legal rules and sanctions,
which “purport to govern the relations in question”.42 The
theoretical anxiety is clear and it has a name:
“bindingness”, i.e. the circumstances under which the
parties engaged get to respect what has been mutually
agreed in an informal setting. Binmore43 stresses the
existence of common knowledge/understanding among
a number of participants in a procedure, as the basis for
the co-ordinating effects of the norms. The most crucial
issues here are: (1) the free-rider problem (“hold-out”;
see also earlier), where a creditor who decides not to
participate in a workout, finally benefits from the decision
of the other creditors to “reduce the face value of their
claims”; (2) the collective action problem, where creditors
demand a greater part of the overall returns, in order to
consent to the workout44; (3) the heterogeneous priorities
problem, that usually relates to different kinds of
securitisation (mentioned above); and (4) the problem
relating to asymmetric information.45
It can be said that a crucial factor here is the expected
return and the cost of the procedure. In Greece, where
the effectiveness of formal insolvency procedures is low,
this can be a considerable advantage. It is rational for a
creditor to refrain from enforcing claims through formal
proceedings, if they think that the returns, in case of
renegotiation, will be higher, in comparison with the case
of insolvency proceedings.46 Then each participant can
see that it will be in his interests to follow the consensual
agreement, given that there is a rational expectation that
other participants within the pool of creditors will do the
same. Once established, conventions may well be
self-enforcing, with a character of “order without law”.47
In this framework of arguments, we can also see that
the role of insolvency practitioners of formal proceedings
may be a factor not contributing to success. We cannot
but remember the observation of Goldstein48 that the
insolvency profession in general (closely associated with
formal proceedings) is more familiar with “burial rites”
than rescue efforts. As is mentioned, “rescue always
implies risk and courage”.49
This is, most probably, also the case in Greece and this
observation is reaffirmed by Liakopoulos.50 Moreover, in
Greece, most profession members do not seem to receive
suitable turnaround and workout training, lack adequate
corporate finance skills, constructivemanagerial mentality
and (as a result) often pay almost exclusive attention to
the practicalities of liquidation, sometimes also
encouraging creditors to think that way. According to
Tsolka,51 the insolvency law in Greece had, as a main
principle, for many years, the issue of the creditors not
paying adequate attention to the wider economic and
social consequences of corporate failure. It must be said
that this problem also occurs in most other European
countries.
According to Georgakopoulos, some faith needs to be
shown to the capacity of the parties to solve their
problems without resorting to the tools of legislative
imposition.52 Creditors can (and should) solve their
collective action problems and maximise their income.
36 See C. Bird, “The London Approach” (1996) 12 Insolvency Law and Practice 8. The “London Approach” did not have a legal or authorised basis: “… It is merely an
informal codification of a set of practices that had come to be widely accepted …”.
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of social behavior” in P. Collett (ed.), Social Rules and Social Behavior (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977), pp.28–41.
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40 See Flood et al, The Professional Restructuring of Corporate Rescue (1995), p.5.
41 J. Armour and S. Deakin, “Norms in Private Insolvency: The ‘London Approach’ to the resolution of financial distress” [June 2001] Journal of Corporate Law Studies
28.
42 See also, e.g. S. Macaulay, “Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study” (1963) 28 American Sociological Review 55; H. Beale and A. Dugdale,
“Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies” (1975) 2 British Journal of Law and Society 45; R.C. Ellickson, Order Without Law:
How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); I. Bernstein, “Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry” (1992) 21 Journal of Legal Studies 115.
43K. Binmore, Game Theory and the Social Contract Volume 1: Playing Fair (Cambridge, MA: ITT Press, 1991), pp.139–144.
44 ***.
45 See Armour and Deakin, “Norms in Private Insolvency” [June 2001] Journal of Corporate Law Studies 28, 25.
46S. Gilson, K. John and L. Lang, “Troubled debt restructurings; An empirical study of private reorganization of firms in default” (1990) 27 Journal of Financial Economics
318.
47 See Armour and Deakin, “Norms in Private Insolvency” [June 2001] Journal of Corporate Law Studies 28, 29.
48 See Flood et al, The Professional Restructuring of Corporate Rescue (1995), p.17. See also M. Goldstein, “The company voluntary arrangement: twenty questions”
(unpublished paper).
49 See Goldstein, “The company voluntary arrangement: twenty questions” (unpublished paper).
50T. Liakopoulos, “Collective procedures of creditor repayment and corporate rehabilitation” (1983) Greek Commercial Law Review 185–201 (in Greek).
51 See Tsolka, Problematic Companies (1987), p.14.
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The importance of insolvency law can be minimised in
these cases. The fact that this co-ordination takes place
voluntarily and is not imposed by the legislative
provisions means that it will be adapted to the particular
conditions and thus can be more effective. Also, it is not
only bank-creditors which can be involved in such
workouts. As the process is voluntarily, it can also be
used to engage trade-creditors and
employee-representatives/ unions, for the latter in order
to negotiate a fair number of lay-offs, all circumstances
considered (simply put: it is better to save 70% of the
jobs by voluntarily agreeing to a 30% lay-off agreement
than having 100% of the employees losing their jobs).
Major advantages of informal
re-organisation
As already mentioned, informal workouts bring major
advantages as compared to formal procedures.
Secrecy
Amajor advantage of informal re-organisation is secrecy.
The management of the company that faces difficulties
can seek the help of professionals in the field without
having to withstand the drawbacks of publication of their
corporate distress. This comes as a matter of contrast
towards formal rescue processes in Greece, which are
public. The negative side of publicity is that suppliers,
financiers and prospective clientsmay have serious doubts
about engaging in a business context with a company that
faces financial difficulty and this may entail more
burdensome contract terms in order to tackle the increased
risk, or no contracts at all.53 Therefore, it is easily
understood how harmful publicity can be for a turnaround
process. This is often referred to as the “self-fulfilling
prophecy of financial distress”.
Of course, here, a major advantage of the workout
process is also the avoidance of stigma. The “insolvency
stigma” means damage that relates to the harm in
reputation and the violation of moral rules. “Bankruptcy
is perhaps the greatest and most humiliating calamity
which can befall an innocent man”, Adam Smith wrote
already in the “Wealth of the Nations”.54 The essential
impact of it on the life and prestige of the debtor can be
found as early as Roman times. Concerning Greece, in
an early survey in the 1970s, all participating businessmen
who were asked about it, claimed that they would do
everything possible to avoid insolvency and that they
would feel humiliated if they ended up bankrupt.55 A
recent study (2017) from Leiden University (stills)
confirms these research results.56 Moreover, it was found
that severe psychological problems (stress, burnout,
suicidal tendencies etc) and physical health issues (heart
attacks, insomnia) can be directly associated with
financial distress among business owners. Therefore, we
can see another reason that many debtors prefer not to
resort to insolvency proceedings, as they believe that they
are going to undergo loss of reputation or they believe
that, morally speaking, they should pay their debts at any
cost.57
Flexibility
Informal re-organisations are generally deemed to lack
restrictions. The re-organisation process is flexible as
compared to formal procedures. Mutual agreements
between creditors and companies can be reached, e.g.
regarding the actions to be taken by the company (in terms
of restructuring of business operations and financial
restructuring) and the terms under which these take
place.58 Due to the flexible character, “tailor-made”
solutions can be provided and, if this is the case, the
otherwise stable positions of creditors can be deviated
from, by mutual agreement.59 In addition, it can be the
subject of an agreement, in the case of informal
proceedings, that new funding made available takes
priority, separate from current positions and guarantees.60
Costs and speed
In the case of formal legal proceedings, particular
decisions must be drafted and argued before the
bankruptcy judge at each step of the re-organisation.61
Even in the case of prepackaged rescues, like the ones
that have been introduced in Greece, the problem is that
the court has to validate the whole process upon
completion and this means that even if the new law
promises quick procedures, everythingwill be determined
by the capacity of the judicial system to complete the
process. We have already seen the statistics concerning
the disappointing procedural speed of this system in
Greece. An inordinate amount of time may be required
to make any decision that lies outside the ordinary course
of the firm’s business, and therefore when debt is
restructured privately legal costs are reduced because
such decisions can be made more quickly.62
Possible ways to facilitate the urgently
needed rescue culture: towards an
“Athens Approach”
From all the above we can see that the Greek economy
might benefit from a strong(er) “rescue culture”.
53 See Adriaanse, “Restructuring in the Shadow of the Law” (2005), p.30.
54Adam Smith, “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” reprinted in Robert M. Hutchins (ed.), (1952) 39 Great Books of the Western World 148.
55L. Kotsiris, Insolvency, Institution and Reality (1981), p.26 (in Greek).
56 J. van Kesteren, J.A.A. Adriaanse and J.I. van der Rest, “The Story Behind Bankruptcy: When Business Gets Personal” (2017) 17(1) QUT Law Review 57–73.
57L. Kotsiris, “The versatile notion of indebtedness” in “The treatment of indebtedness” (fn.43 above), p.7 (in Greek).
58 See Adriaanse, “Restructuring in the Shadow of the Law” (2005), p.30.
59 See Adriaanse, “Restructuring in the Shadow of the Law” (2005), p.30.
60 See Adriaanse, “Restructuring in the Shadow of the Law” (2005), p.30.
61Gilson, John and Lang, “Troubled debt restructurings” (1990) 27 Journal of Financial Economics 318, 319.
62Gilson, John and Lang, “Troubled debt restructurings” (1990) 27 Journal of Financial Economics 318, 319.
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Statement of Principles
The financial crisis has caused severe problems in the
Greek market and, normally, the legislator should try to
contribute to stability and not induce further unrest with
constant and erratic law-making. However, in our opinion,
the legislator should leavemore space to private initiatives
for corporate rescue and its interference should only have
the character of a generic and abstract regulator.
Our proposal is that a new code on management of
distressed loans and the activities of banking institutions
should be introduced. There, the notion of informal
workouts could be described, by setting an abstract outline
where the parties should have a wider margin to act and
they would also find their limits (i.e. cases of
arbitrariness). Something like awritten LondonApproach,
an “Athens Approach”. The guarding of this integrated
system of rules of non-statutory character could be done
by the European Central Bank (ECB) (at least at an initial
stage, with the creation of a task force), the Central Bank
of Greece, the major creditors (the banks) or the
turnaround and insolvency profession. Ideally, the
initiative is guarded by private sector parties. INSOL
International—the worldwide federation for insolvency
professionals with more than 10,000 members63—can
also be helpful in this regard. In 2000, it introduced the
so-called “Statement of Principles for a Global Approach
to Multi-creditor Workouts” (hereinafter the Statement
of Principles or Code) which, according to the documents
at the time of publication, was endorsed by the World
Bank, the Bank of England, many international
commercial banks and consultancy agencies as well as
the British Bankers’ Association (with 320 banks as
members; established in more than 60 countries).
The core of the Statement of Principles—consisting of
eight principles which can be regarded as a best practice
for informal re-organisations64—is recognised in various
“local” versions.
The Statement of Principles was published in order to
bring the different globally used informal procedures
(“voluntary rescue frameworks”) more in line with each
other and to formalise them in a consistent system. It was
drawn up by more than 150 experts from as many
organisations and consists, as mentioned, of eight
principles which should be used during an informal
re-organisation/workout in order to increase the chances
of success. Table 1 below summarises the main
characteristics of the eight principles.
Table 1: Principles of the INSOL International Code
CharacteristicPrinciple
The relevant creditors voluntarily “mark time”.1
None of the creditors takes any individual action on the
condition that their relative positions remain intact.
2
Table 1: Principles of the INSOL International Code
The debtor (company in financial difficulties) does not
take any actions which may jeopardise the relative po-
sitions of the creditors.
3
In order to speed up the decision-making process,
creditor groups are formed if possible and necessary
(groups of secured, senior and junior creditors for in-
stance).
4
In order to be able to evaluate proposals for solutions,
the debtor must grant the relevant creditors timely and
full access to all relevant information.
5
Proposals for workout agreements must be formulated
on the basis of prevailing legislation and relative posi-
tions of the creditors.
6
All information must be available and should be treated
in confidence.
7
When new financing is provided during the informal
re-organisation, it must be given a priority status.
8
The fundamental objectives therefore are reaching a
stable situation where none of the parties take any
individual action as well as a free flow of information
where all parties within the process can take decisions
without worsening their relative positions. We stress that
the Code can also be used in situations in which only one
lender-bank is involved as the principles merely serve as
a best practice for multi-party interaction.
Education and adoption
The Greek state should be proactive in creating the
framework throughwhich turnaroundmanagers, bankers
and lawyers with turnaroundmanagement education will
be trained early on in their academic and professional life
to take on a role as promotor and facilitator of informal
workouts using the proposed Code (“Athens Approach”).
This could mean that management schools and law
schools in Greece should include in their curricula
relevant multidisciplinary courses on informal business
failure prevention (“turnaround management”) in which
elements of economy/law/psychology play a key role to
teach students how to avoid corporate failure and with
that formal bankruptcy procedures.
After the point of education, on-the-job training of the
above-mentioned professionals could take place in special
schools in Greece or abroad, with the care of the
respective professional or trade unions and Bar
Associations, which should be interested in providing
their members with adequate knowledge in order to tackle
the challenges of informal workouts in an effective way.
The role of banks in promoting informal
workouts and with that a rescue culture
Banks in Greece have been bailed out twice during the
latter crisis that the country was getting through. This
generous injection of fresh cash should be accompanied
by greater willingness to fund new and distressed
63 For more information, see the INSOL International webpage available at: https://www.insol.org/ [Accessed 11 June 2019].
64 See, for the full version, the INSOL International webpage under “Library”.
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companies that demonstrate serious business plans. This
is not a matter of morality, even though it could be
perceived this way. This is, mainly, a matter of financial
rationality as the economy, according to publicly
expressed opinions of many members of different Greek
governments, fell into a “death spiral” which also affected
the liquidity of banking institutions. This vicious circle
must be broken. Moreover, it is imperative that banks
upgrade their rescue/intensive care units as
institutionalised and central parts of their entity, with
experienced turnaround managers. According to the
above-mentioned Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2016 survey,65
these units have not managed to tackle the issue of
distressed loans.
In general, we feel it is important that Greek banks
becomemore actively engaged in creating a rescue culture
in Greece, including the introduction of an “Athens
Approach” by way of the development of a Statement of
Principles and the promotion and actual use of such a
new way of dealing with distressed clients.
De-stigmatising insolvency
In any effort to argue for more lenient procedures for
those who lost their ability to repay their debt, and
particularly when arguing that the informal procedures
are the way to solve the problem, we will encounter the
disbelief of those who keep addressing insolvency as a
sin. We can verify that we encountered such attitudes
during the research in Greece (also in the Netherlands,
by the way). After this change takes place, corporate
executives will be less reluctant to seek help, to admit
and share with others their concerns, and this will
facilitate rescue efforts at earlier stages, when the
successful outcome can be more probable.
Concluding remarks
The state of the Greek economy is not permitting even
the most optimist analyst to be reassured about the future.
The issue of non-performing loans (NPLs) and the
alarming amount of distressed and zombie companies is
probably the most worrying of the facts that determine
the negative prospects. The mission of this article is to
present the alternative of informal re-organisation/
workouts as a means that can be utilised in an effective
way to really make the difference in the field of corporate
rescue. It has been presented that there should be
significance attributed to the rescue not only of companies
that are strongly projecting signs of clear viability, but
also those which, even though they face more problems,
can be rescued by means of business restructuring.
Of course, this kind of argumentation would be
incomplete if we did not mention the general background
of failure, the basic reasons that drove many Greek
companies to the disaster and, most importantly, doomed
their turnaround efforts. It has been found that the Greek
economy and its corporate life have been plagued, apart
from the latter severe crisis, by many pathogens like state
interventionism, hyperactive and distractive labour unions,
badmanagement, lack of attention to financial statements,
bad strategy, wrong shareholders’ perceptions and
non-wise funding policy on behalf of the banks which,
lately, took the form of problematic and restricted access
to funding. Banking institutions have contributed to the
creation of many distressed firms, yet they can also offer
the key to a solution by means of actively promoting and
using informal workout principles.
Then there has been an analysis on the dogmatic
foundations of informal workouts to be able to provide
arguments on their necessity and compatibility with a
legal regime. It became clear that senior scholars and,
most importantly, insolvency professionals worldwide,
accept and support the idea that informal processes have
merits that need to be addressed and the precedent of the
“London Approach” offers a great paradigm.
Also, we have set out a framework of proposals that
could be adopted as an alternative to formal insolvency
procedures to introduce a real rescue culture in Greece.
We also think that there should be radical changes in the
field of the Greek insolvency profession, paying greater
attention to the notion of turnaround management, and
with that bridging the gap between legal education and
business economics. Moreover, we have the opinion that
banks should improve their support for the market and
evolve their syndication competencies. Furthermore, we
believe that the general predisposition towards insolvency
and insolvents should change (“de-stigmatising
insolvency”) and this could mean, apart from the above,
that psychological support strategies should be introduced.
Let’s move towards an “Athens Approach”!
65OECD Economic Surveys, “Greece Overview” (March 2016).
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